The Future of Satellite Navigation: A Call for Action

In July, Iran tried to fulfill its threat to close the Strait of Hormuz, a critical passage that had already become unreliable for commercial use. During the conflict, over 1,100 ships experienced GPS and AIS interference in a single day. Ships appeared on tracking systems in unexpected locations like airports or inland Iran. Crews navigated this busy waterway by radar, as satellite navigation became unreliable. Iran’s actions highlighted the vulnerability of satellite infrastructure that the modern world relies on.

The United States depends heavily on the Global Positioning System (GPS) as a second, less noticeable chokepoint. GPS timestamps credit card transactions and stock trades, synchronizes power grids and cellular networks, and guides both agricultural machinery and military operations. A signal designed in the 1970s, when our adversaries were less advanced, now supports the entire global economy and military edge. That era is over.

In 2024, the global aviation sector reported around 430,000 incidents of GPS jamming and spoofing, marking a 62% increase in just one year. Building a basic jammer requires only inexpensive, easily available parts.

“I know the importance of reliable navigation in combat,” said a former Ranger. “GPS was crucial in guiding teams and synchronizing operations without being noticed.” Today’s service members operate in contested environments with outdated systems. This situation demands attention.

Oil tankers and cargo ships line up at the Strait of Hormuz, visible from Khor Fakkan, United Arab Emirates, as of March 2026. No incremental optimization can rectify GPS’s inherent frailty; its limitations are rooted in physics, not engineering oversights. A satellite broadcasting at moderate Earth orbit emits only a faint signal at the receiver level, which a nearby jammer can easily overpower. Military M-Code provides some improvement but does not alter the core issue.

China has recognized this vulnerability. The Chinese Communist Party is developing advanced navigation satellites, including low Earth orbit (LEO) constellations, which broadcast stronger signals designed for electronic warfare. Beijing’s goal is to lead in the navigation sector of the 21st-century economy. Last year’s defense authorization highlighted the U.S. falling behind China in satellite navigation capabilities.

The solution isn’t another sluggish government initiative. American commercial industry has taken the lead. U.S. businesses have developed and launched navigation satellites using private funds. These systems operate in LEO and transmit signals up to 100 times stronger than GPS. They are inherently resistant to spoofing, provide centimeter-level accuracy, and are compatible with existing GPS receivers in vehicles, aircraft, and vessels through simple software updates.

The Space Force has acknowledged this shift. Earlier this year, it canceled plans for a government-owned “Resilient GPS (R-GPS)” constellation to leverage commercial services instead. The fiscal year 2027 defense bill in the House now mandates the Air Force demonstrate capabilities using commercial LEO providers, testing operations without GPS and resistance to jamming and spoofing.

This demonstration marks a positive step forward, but more is needed. Here are three specific steps to implement congressional directives effectively:

• Allocate funding as Congress already directed. The 2027 defense appropriations bill should earmark a dedicated budget for the commercial LEO demonstration and future services. This investment is far cheaper than a single GPS III satellite.
• Purchase operational services, not more research studies. Commercial providers are already deploying production satellites via private capital. The Department of Defense should contract for resilient navigation as a service, similar to launch services, and pay for proven results.
• Set resilience standards for key infrastructure. Merchant crews using outdated receivers this spring illustrates the urgency. Federal regulators must establish resilience criteria that legacy GPS cannot uphold alone.

In 1973, the United States bet on navigation satellites transforming warfare and the global economy. While this gamble succeeded, adversaries learned what to target. Iran’s actions exposed vulnerabilities previously taken for granted. More capable opponents plan to disrupt what is expected to remain reliable.

The future of navigation belongs to the nation prioritizing resilient capabilities. American industry has already taken significant strides. Whether the U.S. government keeps pace will decide if America maintains its longstanding advantage or surrenders it to another power.