Soon, the Supreme Court will conclude its term, leaving significant legal ramifications. Since the conservative supermajority’s rise in 2020, this scenario has become common. Although headlines will showcase individual decisions, like setbacks to the Voting Rights Act, the deeper issue lies in the court’s newfound autonomy. We are seeing the maturation of a court that operates independently from the traditional checks and balances of the American system.
For years, the Supreme Court functioned with an underlying fear of reversal. This acted as a check on how far the justices could stray from mainstream constitutional interpretation. Historically, several constitutional amendments and legislative acts aimed to counteract Supreme Court decisions, such as the passage of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act in 2009 or amendments like the 11th and 26th. The court sometimes also reverses its own rulings, seen in overturning Bowers v. Hardwick in 2003.
However, in today’s politically polarized and often stagnant legislative environment, this fear is significantly diminished. The current justices realize that a divided Congress struggles to pass corrective measures or propose new amendments. The existing conservative majority in the court, which may persist for years, faces little threat of reversal by future courts.
Without this fear of being overruled, the search for neutral legal principles becomes secondary. Instead, personal policy preferences that remain unchecked predominate. To restore public trust in the court, we need more than increasing the number of its seats; the very structure and power of the judiciary require fundamental changes. This involves reintroducing the chance for the court’s decisions to be corrected.
One proposed method involves a structural shift: expanding the court’s size and altering its decision-making process. Congress could use its constitutional power to increase the number of justices. Moreover, justices should not form a permanent body of nine but instead hear cases in randomly assigned three-judge panels with decisive authority.
This would change the incentives for justices. When their opinions hold weight for potentially decades, they might act as ideological pioneers. However, knowing that another panel could soon overturn their decisions encourages moderation and respect for precedent. Additionally, a larger justice pool appointed by different administrations would reduce politicized battles over judicial appointments.
Final authority granted to these smaller panels would prevent an ideological court majority from having the last word. Critics might suggest that this arrangement could lead to inconsistent rulings. Yet, the current stability is less settled peace and more an ideological stalemate. A panel system might promote cases being decided narrowly, encouraging compromise to withstand review by different panels.
This idea does not disregard constitutional principles. Article III allows Congress to define the judicial system’s structure, evidenced by the Supreme Court’s fluctuating size throughout history. U.S. courts of appeals already operate with three-judge panels. The proposed system offers a structural correction, urging the Supreme Court to function with accountability rather than rigid ideology.
Restoring the court’s reversal fear is an act of institutional humility. With diminishing public confidence, the court’s authority must stem from being correct, not merely being the final say. We require a Supreme Court that is final only when appropriate.
Paul M. Collins, Jr., a Legal Studies and Political Science professor at the University of Massachusetts Amherst, coauthored “Supreme Bias: Gender and Race in U.S. Supreme Court Confirmation Hearings.” Copyright 2026 Nexstar Media Inc. All rights reserved.